Profit Maximization for Online Advertising Demand-Side Platforms by Grigas, Paul et al.
Profit Maximization for Online Advertising Demand-Side
Platforms
Paul Grigas, Alfonso Lobos
University of California, Berkeley
pgrigas,alobos@berkeley.edu
Zheng Wen
Adobe Research
zwen@adobe.com
Kuang-chih Lee
Yahoo Inc.
kclee@yahoo-inc.com
ABSTRACT
We develop an optimization model and corresponding algorithm
for the management of a demand-side platform (DSP), whereby
the DSP aims to maximize its own prot while acquiring valuable
impressions for its advertiser clients. We formulate the problem of
prot maximization for a DSP interacting with ad exchanges in a
real-time bidding environment in a cost-per-click/cost-per-action
pricing model. Our proposed formulation leads to a nonconvex
optimization problem due to the joint optimization over both im-
pression allocation and bid price decisions. We use Lagrangian
relaxation to develop a tractable convex dual problem, which, due
to the properties of second-price auctions, may be solved eciently
with subgradient methods. We propose a two-phase solution proce-
dure, whereby in the rst phase we solve the convex dual problem
using a subgradient algorithm, and in the second phase we use the
previously computed dual solution to set bid prices and then solve
a linear optimization problem to obtain the allocation probability
variables. On several synthetic examples, we demonstrate that our
proposed solution approach leads to superior performance over a
baseline method that is used in practice.
1 INTRODUCTION
In targeted online advertising, the main goal is to gure out the best
opportunities by showing an advertisement to an online user, who
is most likely to take a desired action, such as ordering a product
or signing up for an account. e complexity of realizing this goal
is so high that advertisers need specialized technology solutions
called demand-side platforms (DSP).
In a DSP, each individual advertiser usually sets up a list of cam-
paigns that can be thought of as plans for delivering advertisements.
For each campaign, the advertiser species the characteristics of the
audience segments that she would like to target (e.g., males, ages
18-35, who view news articles on espn.com) along with the particu-
lar media that she would like to display to the target audience (e.g.,
a video ad for beer). In addition, the advertiser species a budget
amount, time schedule, pacing details, and performance goals for
each campaign. e performance goals typically can be specied
by minimizing cost-per-click (CPC) or cost-per-action (CPA).
e DSP manages its active campaigns for many dierent ad-
vertisers simultaneously across multiple ad exchanges where ad
impressions can be acquired through a real-time bidding (RTB)
process. In the RTB process, the DSP interacts with several ad ex-
changes where bids are placed for potential impressions on behalf
of those advertisers. is interaction happens in real time when an
ad request is submied to an ad exchange (which may happen, for
example, when a user views a news story on a webpage). In this
scenario, the DSP needs to oer a solution to decide, among the
list of all campaigns associated with its advertiser clients, which
campaign to bid on behalf of and how much to oer for the corre-
sponding bid. e fundamental problem we consider here is how
to make these decisions in real time to maximize the prot for the
DSP while ensuring that all of its advertiser clients are satised.
Generally speaking, today most DSPs oer dierent pricing mod-
els and enhancement schemes to help advertisers manage their cam-
paigns. ose pricing models include cost per thousand impressions
(CPM), cost per click (CPC) and cost per action (CPA). Advertisers
oen like to choose the CPC/CPA pricing model because the return
on investment (ROI) is always positive. However, this pricing model
might introduce revenue loss for the DSP since the DSP only earns
revenue when a click or action occurs. erefore, in CPC/CPA
pricing model, the DSP needs to convert the CPC/CPA bid to an
expected cost per thousand impressions (eCPM) bid in order to
sensibly participate in auctions in the RTB exchanges. In this paper,
we focus on CPC/CPA pricing model as it is a very challenging
problem for the DSP.
It is challenging for a DSP to perform such prot optimization
with CPC/CPA pricing model in a RTB environment for several
reasons. First, top DSPs typically receive as many as a million
ad requests per second. e short latency and high throughput
requirements introduce extreme time sensitivity on the process.
Second, a large amount of information is missing in the real time
evaluation of the individual ad requests, e.g., the feedback on pre-
vious decisions normally has a long delay in practice. erefore,
most of the DSPs today only apply a greedy approach by selecting
the ad with the highest bid among all the qualied ads for each
incoming request.
In this paper, we propose a novel approach based on a precise
mathematical formulation to optimize the overall DSP prot. We
appropriately model the uncertainty in impression arrival, auction,
and click/action processes and develop an optimization formulation
to maximize prot for the DSP while ensuring that each campaign
remains under budget. Our formulation is aimed at optimizing with
respect to both impression allocation and bid price decisions, and
due to the additional complexity of accounting for both of these de-
cisions the formulation is a large-scale, nonconvex model. However,
due to the properties of second-price auctions we are able to eec-
tively use the technique of Lagrangian relaxation. We construct a
dual problem and establish that subgradients of the dual function
may be eciently computed. Our overall approach is based on a
two-phase procedure, wherein we solve the dual problem in the
rst phase and use the dual solution to naturally recover a primal
solution in the second phase. We conduct several computational
experiments on synthetic datasets and demonstrate that our La-
grangian relaxation based approach is able to signicantly increase
DSP prots relative to a baseline greedy approach.
Revenue optimization in online advertising has been extensively
studied in recent literature from dierent perspectives, such as
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optimization [2, 4, 9, 13], game theory and mechanism design [1, 7],
and contract design [10]. Due to space limitations, we only review
several directly relevant papers. [2–4] focus on the publisher’s
revenue management problem. Specically, [2, 3] study how pub-
lishers should optimally trade o guaranteed contracts with RTB.
[4] studies how a publisher should optimally allocate impressions
and set up bid prices for campaigns, under the implicit assumption
that the publisher is a “central planner”. On the other hand, [5]
studies ad networks’ revenue management problem based on model
predictive control. Finally, [13] studies advertisers’ optimal bidding
problem in RTB. Unlike our paper, [13] focuses on optimal bidding
and its framework does not consider impression allocation.
e rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
describe the notation and problem statement and we set up the
model. e prot optimization formulation is presented in Section
3. Our proposed Lagrangian relaxation based algorithm to approxi-
mately solve the prot optimization problem is specied in Section
4. Experimental results are presented in Section 5, and we conclude
with some remarks about possible future work.
2 MODEL FOUNDATIONS
We assume that the planning takes place over a xed time horizon
(e.g., 24 hours). To simplify the presentation, we also assume that
the DSP interacts with a single ad exchange. For our purposes,
the ad exchange simply represents a pool of potential impressions
that the DSP may bid on. us, in the likely scenario that the DSP
interacts with more than one ad exchange, we may simply group
all of the dierent ad exchanges together into a representative ad
exchange.
Let I denote the set of impression types and let K denote the set
of all campaigns associated with advertisers managed by the DSP.
Before discussing the details of our assumptions, let us describe
the basic ow of events in the model. When an impression of type
i ∈ I is submied to the ad exchange, a real-time second-price
auction is held for which the DSP has an opportunity to bid. us
the DSP has an opportunity to make two strategic decisions related
to each real-time auction: (i) how to select a campaign k ∈ K to bid
on behalf of in the auction, and (ii) how to set the corresponding
bid price bik . If the DSP wins the auction on behalf of campaign
k , then the DSP must pay the ad exchange an amount equal to the
second largest price and an ad from campaign k is displayed. e
advertiser corresponding to campaign k is charged only if a user
clicks on the ad.
Impression Types. It is important that the set of impression types
I represents a partition of all possible impressions that are sub-
mied to the ad exchange. us, every impression submied to
the ad exchange is associated with a particular impression type
i ∈ I. It is most natural to dene I in terms of features associated
with impressions. For example, if the DSP determines that there are
only two relevant aributes associated with each impression – say
gender and whether or not the viewer is 18 years or older – then
the DSP would choose I = {(M, 18−), (M, 18+), (F , 18−), (F , 18+)}.
en, all impressions corresponding to male viewers who are under
18 years of age would be assigned to impression type i = (M, 18−),
etc. Note that the construction of the set I is part of the mod-
eling process and consideration should be given to the trade-o
between computational limitations and the potential for higher
prots due to a more ne-grained construction of I. Nevertheless,
the algorithmic schemes we propose in Section 3 are scalable to
problem instances where the size of I is extremely large. We use
the following notation and make the following assumptions about
the impression types:
• Let Si denote the number of impressions of type i that arrive
during the planning horizon, and assume that Si is a random
variable with mean si .
Campaigns. Recall that K denotes the set of all campaigns that
are managed by the DSP. at is,K is the union over all advertisers
(who are managed by the DSP) of the sets of campaigns run by each
advertiser. We use the following notation and make the following
assumptions about the campaigns:
• mk denotes the (advertiser selected) budget for campaign k dur-
ing the planning horizon.
• Ik denotes the set of impression types that campaign k targets.
For example, if an advertiser wishes to create a particular cam-
paign to target female users, then in this case Ik would denote
the set of all impression types corresponding to female users (e.g.,
Ik = {(F , 18−), (F , 18+)} in the example described above). Note
that each advertiser can create multiple campaigns to achieve
dierent targeting goals.
• In this model, it is assumed that advertisers are charged on a
CPC (cost per click) basis. at is, campaign k is charged an
amount qk > 0, called the CPC price, each time a user clicks
on an advertisement from campaign k . (Note that a “click” may
also be thought of more generally as an “action” whereby our
model easily extends to campaigns that are charged on a CPA
basis. Moreover, our model may be easily extended to allow for
multiple actions, each with their own rewards.)
Auctions. When an impression is submied to the ad exchange,
an instantaneous real-time auction occurs to determine who gets
to display an advertisement. We assume that these are second-price
auctions, which are very common in practice. In a second-price
auction, the bidder who submits the highest bid is the winner, but
the amount that the winner pays is the amount of the second highest
bid. It is well known that, in a second-price auction, a dominant
strategy for each participant is to bid truthfully [12]. Herein we
assume that the DSP takes a probabilistic approach to modeling the
behavior of the other bidders in the auction. Namely, we make the
following assumptions:
• For each impression type i ∈ I , let Bmaxi be a random variable
representing the maximum, among all other bidders excluding
the DSP, of the bid prices entered in an auction for an impression
of type i . It is assumed that Bmaxi > 0 with probability one. Let
ρi (·) : R → [0, 1] denote the cumulative distribution function
(CDF) of Bmaxi , so that ρi (b) := P(Bmaxi ≤ b) is the probability
that the DSPwins an auction for an impression of type i when the
DSP enters the bid b. Note that the functions ρi (·) are typically
estimated using a bid landscape model (see, e.g., [6]). (In the case
of a tie, here we assume that the DSP automatically wins the
auction. Our framework may be easily adapted to the case of a
fair tie-breaking mechanism.)
• Furthermore, let βmaxi (b) := E[Bmaxi | Bmaxi ≤ b] denote the
expected value of the second highest bid price (i.e., the value of
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the payment to the ad exchange) given that the DSP enters a bid
price of b and b is the largest bid price entered.
Click Events. Aer the DSP has won an auction on behalf of
campaign k , an ad for campaign k is displayed to the user corre-
sponding to the impression for which the auction was held. For
a given impression type i ∈ I and a given campaign k ∈ K , let
θik ∈ [0, 1] denote the click-through-rate for users corresponding
to impression type i and when the ad corresponds to campaign
k . at is, θik represents the fraction of users corresponding to
impression type i that click on an ad associated with campaign
k , i.e., the probability that the user clicks on the ad that is shown.
Although the true click-through-rates are not available, the DSP is
typically able to leverage a vast amount of historical data and use
predictive models to produce accurate predictions of these values,
even when K and I are extremely large (see, e.g., [8]).
Finally, given an impression type i ∈ I and a campaign k ∈ K ,
let rik denote the expected cost per impression (eCPI) value, namely
rik := qkθik where qk is the CPC price dened earlier. Note that
rik is the expected amount of revenue that the DSP earns each time
an ad for campaign k is shown to an impression of type i , and rik
also corresponds to the optimal bid price when campaign k has
unlimited budget.
Decision Variables and Additional Notation. As mentioned previ-
ously, when an auction for impression type i ∈ I arrives to the ad
exchange, the DSP decides which campaign k ∈ K to bid of behalf
of and also selects the value of the corresponding bid price. Let
E ⊆ I × K denote the edges of an undirected bipartite graph be-
tween I and K , whereby there is an edge e = (i,k) ∈ E whenever
campaign k targets impression type i , i.e, E := {(i,k) : i ∈ Ik }. Let
Ki := {k ∈ K : (i,k) ∈ E} denote the set of campaigns that target
impression type i .
When a new auction for impression type i arrives to the ad ex-
change, we say that the DSP selects campaign k for the auction if
the DSP chooses to bid on behalf campaign k in the auction. For
each edge (i,k) ∈ E, we dene two decision variables as follows: (i)
xik is the probability that the DSP selects campaign k , and (ii) bik
is the corresponding bid price that the DSP submits in the auction.
Interpreted dierently, xik represents a proportional allocation, i.e.,
the fraction of auctions for impression type i that are allocated to
campaign k on average. Note that bik represents the bid price that
the DSP submits to an auction for impression type i conditional
on the fact that the DSP has selected campaign k for the auction.
Related approaches (e.g., as in [4]) also use bid prices to rank ad-
vertisers – in our approach, the selection of which campaign to bid
on behalf of is completely captured by the xik decision variables
and thus the bik decision variables only determine the actual bid
price decisions. Let x, b ∈ R |E | denote vectors of these quantities,
which will represent decision variables in our model.
Let us also dene some additional notation used herein. For
a given set S and a function f (·) : S → R, let argmaxx ∈S f (x)
denote the (possibly empty) set of maximizers of the function f (·)
over the set S . If f (·) : Rn → R is a convex function then, for a
given x ∈ Rn , ∂ f (x) denotes the set of subgradients of f (·) at x ,
i.e., the set of vectors д such that f (y) ≥ f (x) + дT (y − x) for all
y ∈ Rn . Finally, let 1(·) denote an indicator function that is equal to
1 whenever the argument of 1(·) is true and equal to 0 otherwise.
3 OPTIMIZATION FORMULATION
Problem (1) presents our formulation of the allocation and real-time
bidding planning problem faced by the DSP.
maximize
x,b
∑
(i,k)∈E
[rik − βmaxi (bik )]sixikρi (bik )
subject to
∑
i ∈Ik riksixikρi (bik ) ≤ mk ∀k ∈ K∑
k ∈Ki xik ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ I
x, b ≥ 0 .
(1)
Herein, let pi (x, b) := ∑(i,k )∈E [rik −βmaxi (bik )]sixikρi (bik ) denote
the objective function of (1). Let us now briey describe the interpre-
tation of each part of the formulation (1) above. First, note that the
formulation is based on the idea of “deterministic approximation,”
whereby we assume that all random quantities deterministically
take on their expected values. In this formulation, the DSP seeks to
maximize its total prot over the planning horizon, while ensuring
that each campaign does not spend more than its budget. Indeed,
the expected number of times during the planning horizon that the
DSP selects campaign k for an auction of impression type i is sixik
and the expected number of such auctions that the DSP wins is
sixikρi (bik ). Furthermore, for each instance that the DSP selects
campaign k and wins the corresponding auction for impression
type i , the expected prot for the DSP is rik − βmaxi (bik ). erefore,
the objective function of (1) represents the expected total prot
earned by the DSP throughout the planning horizon. e rst set of
constraints in (1) represent the budget constraints for the campaigns,
which ensure that, in expectation, each campaign does not spend
more than its pre-specied budget level. Finally, the second set of
constraints in (1) are referred to as the supply constraints for the
impression types, which (along with the nonnegativity constraints
on x) ensure that the variables x represent valid probabilities. Note
also that these probabilities may sum to a value strictly less than 1,
in which case 1 −∑k ∈Ki xik represents the probability of electing
not to bid when an impression of type i arrives to the ad exchange.
For ease of notation, let us denote the supply and nonnegativity con-
straints on x using S := {x : ∑k ∈Ki xik ≤ 1 for all i ∈ I, x ≥ 0}.
Note that, due to the joint optimization over both x and b, prob-
lem (1) is generally a nonconvex optimization problem (this is
clearly evident, for example, when Bmaxi is taken to be uniformly
distributed on [0, 1] and hence ρi (bik ) = bik for bik ∈ [0, 1]). De-
spite its nonconvexity, problem (1) does have some important struc-
tural properties that we now highlight. First, if we consider the
bid prices b to be xed, then the resulting problem in x is a linear
optimization problem – in other words the objective function and
constraints can all be expressed as linear functions of x – and may
be solved very eciently using o-the-shelf solvers or perhaps
a specialized algorithm. Conversely, if we consider x to be xed,
then the resulting problem in b is generally still nonconvex but
the main “diculty” arises from the budget constraints. Indeed,
due to the presence of budget constraints, it may be optimal for
the DSP to underbid on a relatively less valuable impression due
to the possibility of a more valuable impression arriving in the
future. erefore, whenever a campaign has unlimited budget, it
is optimal for the DSP to set bik = rik , i.e., to bid truthfully. e
following Proposition, which will be useful in the development of
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the Lagrangian relaxation algorithm in Section 4, formalizes this
intuition.
Proposition 3.1. Consider the following modication of (1) with-
out budget constraints:
maximize
x,b
∑
(i,k)∈E
[rik − βmaxi (bik )]sixikρi (bik )
subject to x ∈ S and b ≥ 0 ,
(2)
where S := {x : ∑k ∈Ki xik ≤ 1 for all i ∈ I, x ≥ 0}, as dened
earlier. Dene (x∗, b∗) by b∗ik := rik for all (i,k) ∈ E and by leing
x∗ be an arbitrary optimal solution of the resulting linear optimization
problem, i.e., x∗ ∈ argmax
x∈S
{∑
(i,k )∈E piikxik
}
, where piik := [rik −
βmaxi (rik )]siρi (rik ) for all (i,k) ∈ E. en, (2) is nite and (x∗, b∗)
is an optimal solution of (2).
Proof. Fix an arbitrary x ∈ S and consider the resulting prob-
lem in the b variables:
maximize
b
∑
(i,k)∈E
[rik − βmaxi (bik )]sixikρi (bik )
subject to b ≥ 0 .
(3)
We now demonstrate that, regardless of the value of x, an optimal
solution of (3) is given by b∗, i.e., by seing b∗ik = rik for all(i,k) ∈ E. Indeed, note that (3) is completely separable across the
bik variables. us, since xik ≥ 0, for each (i,k) ∈ E we simply
need to independently solve
maximize
bik
[rik − βmaxi (bik )]ρi (bik )1(xik > 0)
subject to bik ≥ 0 ,
(4)
where 1(xik > 0) is an indicator function that is equal to 1 whenever
xik > 0 and 0 otherwise. If xik = 0, then the objective function
in (4) is always 0 and hence any value of bik ≥ 0, in particular
b∗ik := rik , is an optimal solution. Otherwise, if xik > 0, then the
objective function in (4) is just the expected utility when entering
a bid of bik into a second price auction when the valuation is equal
to rik ≥ 0, for which the dominant strategy is to bid truthfully.
us, in either case, it is clear that b∗ik := rik is an optimal solution
of (4) and it follows that the vector b∗ is an optimal solution of
(3). Recall that pi (x, b) denotes the objective function of (1) and
hence also the objective function of (2). en we have shown that
pi (x, b∗) ≥ pi (x, b) for all b ≥ 0. us, since x ∈ S was selected
arbitrarily, we have:
pi (x∗, b∗) ≥ pi (x, b∗) ≥ pi (x, b) for all x ∈ S, b ≥ 0 ,
which shows that (x∗, b∗) is an optimal solution of (2). 
Remark 3.1. Given coecientspiik ∈ R for each (i,k) ∈ E, an opti-
mal solution x∗ of the linear optimization problemmax
x∈S
{∑
(i,k)∈E piikxik
}
may be computed eciently inO(|E |) time using a simple greedy algo-
rithm. Namely, for each i ∈ I, we computek∗(i) ∈ argmaxk ∈Ki {piik },
set xik∗(i) = 1(piik∗(i) > 0), and set xik = 0 for all other k ∈ Ki .
4 LAGRANGIAN DUAL AND ALGORITHMIC
SCHEME
We begin this section with a high-level description of our approach
for solving (1). Our algorithmic approach is based on a two phase
procedure. In the rst phase, we construct a suitable dual of (1),
which turns out to be a convex optimization problem that can be
eciently solved with most subgradient based algorithms. A so-
lution of the dual problem naturally suggests a way to set the bid
prices b. In the second phase, we set the bid prices using the previ-
ously computed dual solution then we solve the linear optimization
problem that results when b is xed in order to recover allocation
probabilities x.
Let us now construct a Lagrangian dual of the deterministic
approximation problem (1) by relaxing the “dicult” budget con-
straints. We show that the resulting dual problem is a convex
optimization problem with only very simple box constraints and
that subgradients of the objective function may be eciently com-
puted. Since our formulation is quite general (for example, there
are no strong assumptions made about the distribution of Bmaxi ),
we are unable to exploit any special structure of the dual function
L∗(·) and must resort to simple subgradient based algorithms to
solve the dual problem. Nevertheless, subgradient methods oer
the advantage of being highly scalable and parallelizable, and more-
over our overall two phase procedure does not necessitate a high
accuracy solution of the dual problem.
To start, we introduce multipliers λ ∈ R |K |+ for the budget con-
straints in (1) and form the Lagrangian function:
L(x, b, λ) := ∑(i,k )∈E [rik − βmaxi (bik )]sixikρi (bik )
+
∑
k ∈K λk
[
mk −
∑
i ∈Ik riksixikρi (bik )
]
.
(5)
Aer rearranging, we may re-express the Lagrangian function:
L(x, b, λ) =∑(i,k )∈E [(1 − λk )rik − βmaxi (bik )]sixikρi (bik )
+
∑
k ∈K λkmk
(6)
Note that the above implies a natural interpretation of the dual
variables as related to scaling factors, namely 1−λk for each k ∈ K ,
to reduce the bid prices based on the fact that each campaign has
limited budget. e dual function is dened in the standard way:
L∗(λ) := max
x∈S,b≥0
L(x, b, λ) , (7)
and we dene the dual problem as:
minimize
λ
L∗(λ)
subject to 0 ≤ λk ≤ 1 for all k ∈ K .
(8)
Note that the nonnegativity constraints above are standard in La-
grangian duality to ensure that (8) provides a valid upper bound
on (1). e upper bound constraints, i.e., λk ≤ 1 for all k ∈ K , are
without loss of generality since whenever λk > 1 the dual function
L∗(λ) is only improved by instead seing λk = 1. It is always the
case that L∗(·) is a convex function, but in general it may not be
dierentiable. Nevertheless, Procedure 1 precisely describes how
to compute a subgradient of L∗(·) at λ and is based on Proposition
3.1. eorem 4.1 demonstrates that Procedure 1 computes valid
subgradients and also summarizes the most important properties
of the dual function L∗(·) and the dual problem (8).
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Procedure 1 Computing a Subgradient of L∗(·)
Input: λ ∈ R |K | such that 0 ≤ λk ≤ 1 for all k .
1. For each (i,k) ∈ E, set:
b∗(λ)ik ← (1 − λk )rik , and
pi (λ)ik ← [b∗(λ)ik − βmaxi (b∗(λ)ik )]siρi (b∗(λ)ik )
2. Compute x∗(λ) ∈ argmaxx∈S
{∑
(i,k )∈E pi (λ)ikxik
}
using the
greedy algorithm described in Remark 3.1.
3. For each k ∈ K , set:
д(λ)k ←mk −
∑
i ∈Ik riksix
∗(λ)ikρi (b∗(λ)ik ) .
Output: д(λ) ∈ ∂L∗(λ) .
Theorem 4.1. We have the following properties:
(i) L∗(·) is nite and convex everywhere on R |K | .
(ii) For any λ ∈ R |K | such that 0 ≤ λk ≤ 1 for all k , Procedure 1
computes a valid subgradient д(λ) ∈ ∂L∗(λ).
(iii) Let P∗ denote the optimal objective function value of the primal
problem (1), and let D∗ denote the optimal objective function value
of the dual problem (8). en, for any (x, b) that is feasible for (1)
and any λ that is feasible for (8), it holds that:
pi (x, b) ≤ P∗ ≤ D∗ ≤ L∗(λ) .
Proof. Fix λ ∈ R |K | such that λk ≤ 1 for all k and consider
Proposition 3.1 where we replace rik with the modied value (1 −
λk )rik . It is clear that Proposition 3.1 also holds with these modied
values. en, in this case, by (6) it follows that the subproblem
appearing in the denition of L∗(·) in (7) is exactly the same as (2)
(except for the term
∑
k ∈K λkmk , which is just a constant since λ
is xed). erefore, by Proposition 3.1, it holds that L∗(λ) is nite.
e case when λk is possibly greater than 1 for some k is requires a
simple extension of Proposition 3.1 that allows for possibly negative
values of rik . Convexity of L∗(·) follows since L∗(·) is a pointwise
maximum of linear functions.
To prove (ii), again by Proposition 3.1 it follows that Steps (1.) and
(2.) of Procedure 1 are computing a solution of the subproblem in
the denition of L∗(·) given in (7), i.e., it holds that (x∗(λ), b∗(λ)) ∈
argmaxx∈S,b≥0 L(x, b, λ). By (5), Step (3.) of Procedure 1 is comput-
ing the partial gradient of L(x∗(λ), b∗(λ), λ) (holding (x∗(λ), b∗(λ))
xed), i.e., it holds that д(λ) = ∇λL(x∗(λ), b∗(λ), λ). erefore, for
any λ′ ∈ R |K | it holds that:
L∗(λ′) ≥ L(x∗(λ), b∗(λ), λ′)
≥ L(x∗(λ), b∗(λ), λ) + д(λ)T (λ′ − λ)
= L∗(λ) + д(λ)T (λ′ − λ) ,
which by denition implies that д(λ) ∈ ∂L∗(λ). e rst inequal-
ity above follows from the denition of L∗(·), the second inequal-
ity holds since L(x, b, λ) is convex in λ, and the equality holds by
(x∗(λ), b∗(λ)) ∈ argmaxx∈S,b≥0 L(x, b, λ). Finally, (iii) is standard
in Lagrangian duality and we omit its proof. 
Algorithm 2 presents our two phase procedure for obtaining an
approximate solution (xˆ, bˆ) of problem (1). In Phase 1, we solve
the dual problem (8). As mentioned previously, we suggest the
use of simple subgradient methods (see, for example, [11] and the
references therein), with the use of Procedure 1 to compute subgra-
dients, in order to solve this problem. In our experiments in Section
5, we use the basic method of projected subgradient descent with
step-sizes proportional to 1/√T whereT is the iteration counter. In
this case, as evident from Procedure 1, the subgradients will remain
bounded and therefore we may apply classical convergence results
for this method, which state that the objective function value opti-
mality gap converges to zero at the rate ofO(1/√T ) [11]. Moreover,
the per iteration cost of this method is dominated by the cost of
computing a subgradient, which, as is clear from Procedure 1 and
Remark 3.1, is O(|E |).
Algorithm 2 Two Phase Lagrangian Relaxation-based Scheme for
Problem (1)
Phase 1: Solve Lagrangian Relaxation
Solve the dual problem (8) to near global optimality
using a subgradient method, and return dual variables λˆ
and dual objective value Dˆ ← L∗(λˆ).
Phase 2: Primal Recovery
1. Set bid prices bˆ: bˆik ← (1 − λˆk )rik for all (i,k) ∈ E.
2. Consider the primal problem (1) with the b variables
xed at the values bˆ, and solve the resulting linear
optimization problem to obtain allocation probabilities xˆ.
Output: Approximate primal solution (xˆ, bˆ), primal objective
value pi (xˆ, bˆ), and dual upper bound Dˆ.
In Phase 2 of Algorithm 2, we suggest a heuristic to construct
an approximate primal solution (xˆ, bˆ) based on the previously com-
puted dual solution λˆ. First, we use the natural correspondence
suggested by (6) to set the bid prices bˆ. en, we x these bid
prices and solve the resulting linear optimization problem from
(1) to obtain allocation probabilities xˆ. In our experiments, we use
the o-the-shelf solver Gurobi although more sophisticated and
scalable approaches may also be employed. Finally, Algorithm 2
outputs the approximate primal solution (xˆ, bˆ) along with the dual
objective value Dˆ. Using item (iii) of eorem 4.1, we may use
Dˆ to obtain a useful bound on the suboptimality of (xˆ, bˆ), namely
pi (xˆ, bˆ) ≤ P∗ ≤ Dˆ.
5 COMPUTATIONAL EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we present the results of several computational
experiments wherein we applied our two-phase solution procedure
to synthetic data examples and compared its performance to a
baseline policy. Before discussing the experimental results, it is
important to clarify how our model, and in particular the output of
Algorithm 2, should be applied in a practical, online environment.
Policy 3 precisely describes the sequence of events that occur when
a new impression of type i arrives to ad exchange and also describes
how the decision variables (xˆ, bˆ) resulting from Algorithm 2 would
be used to make decisions in real-time. (Recall that the decision
variables x represent probabilities of selecting campaigns, and that
1 − ∑k ∈Ki xik represents the probability of not participating in
an auction for a new impression of type i . In Policy 3 below, the
symbol “0” is used to encode a “null campaign” that represents this
option of refraining from participating in the auction.)
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Policy 3 Online Policy Implied by Algorithm 2
Input: Approximate primal solution (xˆ, bˆ) from Algorithm 2 and
new impression arrival i ∈ I.
1. Sample a campaign k˜ ∈ Ki ∪ {0} according to the distribution
implied by the values xik for k ∈ Ki and 1−
∑
k ∈Ki xik . If k˜ = 0
(the sampled campaign is null) or the sampled campaign k˜ has
depleted its budget, then break.
2. Enter bid price bˆik˜ . If the auction is won, then pay the ad
exchange an amount to equal to the second price. If the auction
is not won, then break.
3. Show an ad for campaign k˜ . If a click happens, then deduct qk˜
from the budget of campaign k˜ and earn revenue qk˜ .
We also refer to Policy 3 as the “Lagrangian policy.” Notice that
Policy 3 is particularly conservative in dealing with what happens
when a campaign depletes its budget. Indeed, if a campaign with
depleted budget is sampled then the DSP does not participate in
the auction. Policy 3 may be improved by incorporating the idea of
model predictive control whereby Algorithm 2 is rerun every time a
campaign depletes its budget, or possibly at periodic time intervals.
We compare Algorithm 2 and correspondingly Policy 3 against a
simple “greedy policy” that is oen employed in practice. Indeed,
the greedy policy has the same basic ow of events as Policy 3 with
two major dierences in how decisions are made: (i) at Step (1.) the
greedy policy selects, among those campaigns in Ki with budgets
that are not yet depleted, the campaign k˜ with the largest eCPI
value of rik , and (ii) at Step (2.) the greedy policy uses rik˜ , the eCPI
value of the selected campaign, as the bid price.
Synthetic Data Examples. Let us now describe how the synthetic
data examples were generated and how the corresponding simu-
lations were conducted. roughout this discussion, all relevant
random variables are generated independently unless otherwise
mentioned. Furthermore, throughout our experiments, it is as-
sumed that the optimization model developed herein is correctly
specied in that all distributional information used by our model
(e.g., in (1) and Algorithm 2) accurately reect the corresponding
random variables in our simulations.
Now, to generate our synthetic instances, we rst x the sizes
of the sets K and I, and for each campaign k ∈ K (and also for
each impression type i ∈ I) we generate a “quality score”Qk (resp.,
Qi ) that is uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. e quality scores are
intended to reect the “desirability” of each impression type and
each campaign and are used to generate the main parameters of
our model. Indeed, for each impression type i ∈ I, the set Ki
is constructed by sampling edges independently with probability
Qi . Hence |Ki | ∼ Bin(|K |,Qi ), where Bin(n,p) denotes a binomial
random variable with n trials and success probability parameter
p. Moreover, for each impression type i ∈ I, Bmaxi is taken to be
the maximum of Bin(M,Qi ) independent random variables that are
uniformly distributed on [0, 1], where M is an integer parameter
dictating the “size of the market.” e click-through-rate values θik
are dened by θik := Qi ·Qk .
In all of our experiments, we set |K | = 100, M = 10, si = 5000
for all i ∈ I, and the CPC value qk = 1 for all k ∈ K . In our
rst experiment, we generated a single problem instance, referred
to as Example A, that additionally had |I | = 100 and the budget
parameters set tomk = 50 for all k ∈ K . In this case, as veried by
the dual upper bound Dˆ, Algorithm 2 was able to solve problem (1)
to within 13% of optimality. We compared the Policy 3 implied by
Algorithm 2 to the “greedy policy” described earlier by simulating
the impression arrival, real-time bidding, and click processes. In our
simulations, we assume that impressions arrive to the ad exchange
according to |I | independent Poisson processes that are “merged”
together. is assumption implies that Si is a Poisson random
variable, and the time horizon T of the overall arrival process is set
so that si = 5000 for each i ∈ I.
Results. e top le table in Figure 1 presents the main results
of our rst experiment on Example A. We ran 500 simulation runs
comparing our Lagrangian relaxation approach, i.e., Policy 3 to the
greedy baseline policy. Each policy saw the same exact sequence
of impression arrivals and the same sequence of realized Bmaxi val-
ues during each individual simulation run. For each simulation
run, we computed the relative prot, relative cost, and relative
revenue of the two policies, where each relative statistic is com-
puted as the Lagrangian statistic relative to the greedy baseline,
e.g., Relative Prot := Lagrangian ProtGreedy Prot . e results in the tables are
averaged over 500 such simulation runs. As the top le table demon-
strates, the Lagrangian policy is able to achieve signicantly higher
prot levels and lower costs than the greedy baseline. Interestingly,
the Lagrangian policy also achieves lower revenue levels than the
greedy policy. is makes good intuitive sense since the Lagrangian
policy uses bid prices that are shaded down by a factor of 1 − λk
as compared to the greedy policy, and moreover the Lagrangian
policy should make smarter allocation decisions whereby, under
the Lagrangian policy, a particularly valuable campaign would wait
for beer opportunities before depleting its budget as compared
to the greedy policy. e boom le table in Figure 1 reports the
budget utilization (dened as total revenue divided by
∑
k ∈Kmk )
and prot margin (dened as total prot divided by total revenue)
statistics for each policy, which conrms our intuition and the re-
sults presented in top le table. Example B constitutes our second
experiment, whereby we took the same exact problem instance and
made one modication, namely instead of using constant budgets
across the dierent campaigns we allowed the budget to be corre-
lated with the quality score of each campaign so thatmk := 50Qk .
As Figure 1 demonstrates, the prot improvement of the Lagrangian
policy over the greedy baseline is even more dramatic in this case.
(Lag./Gr.) Example A Example B
Relative Prot 1.257 1.576
Relative Cost 0.286 0.431
Relative Revenue 0.759 0.677
Example A Example B
Lag. Gr. Lag. Gr.
Budget Util. 0.483 0.636 0.542 0.801
Prot/Revenue 0.807 0.487 0.500 0.215
0.98
1.02
1.06
1.10
10 20 30 40 50
Budget
R
el
at
ive
 P
ro
fit
Relative Profit vs. Budget
Figure 1: Lagrangian two-phase policy vs. greedy policy
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In our third experiment, we generated a fresh problem instance
using all of the same parameters as before except for two dierences:
(i) we set |I | = 10, and (ii) we varied the budget parametersmk ∈
{5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 45, 50} (also we tookmk to be constant
across the dierent campaigns) and reran Algorithm 2 for each of
the 10 budget values. e right side of Figure 1 plots the relative
prot of the two policies versus these budget values, and for each of
the 10 budget values the relative prot statistic was averaged over
500 simulation runs. Clearly, the Lagrangian policy has signicantly
larger prots over the greedy policy for small budget values, but as
the budget increases this improvement is diminished. is makes
sense since the Lagrangian policy is based on accounting for the
budget constraints in (1) via dual variables. Indeed, as the budget
values become larger, the budget constraints are less active and
Proposition 3.1 implies that Policy 3 and the greedy policy are
exactly the same whenmk is large enough for each k ∈ K .
Let us conclude this section by mentioning a few directions for
future research. First, it would be very valuable to also perform
some computational experiments comparing the Lagrangian policy
to the greedy policy using a real advertising dataset. Second, it
would be very interesting to extend our methodology, in particular
problem (1) and Algorithm 2 to dierent pricing models, such as
the CPM pricing model, with performance constraints. Finally, it
would be interesting to examine the benets of more sophisticated
stochastic or robust optimization approaches that more carefully
account for the uncertainty in the impression arrivals and the real-
time bidding environment. e authors plan to pursue all of these
directions in future research.
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